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INTRODUCTION
N his interesting and provocative essay, "Back to Basics: Regulat-
ing How Corporations Speak to the Market,"' Ian Ayres criticizes
our recent article dealing with the so-called "fraud-on-the-market"
theory.2 We, in turn, have some criticisms of his criticism, which we
present in this brief Essay. At the outset, however, we wish to empha-
size that, despite the rather adversarial tone of Professor Ayres's arti-
cle, he does not appear to disagree with either of the principal
arguments we presented. First, Professor Ayres's fine article clearly
shows that he agrees with our proposition that contractual rules
should dictate the nature and extent of a corporation's public disclo-
sure obligation.' Indeed, we argued that the precise contours of the
corporate disclosure obligation should be defined by the contractual
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty managers and officers owe their
shareholders.4 Second, and perhaps more interestingly, Professor
Ayres agrees with our more controversial argument that firms should
have the option of selecting an internal rule of corporate disclosure
permitting them to make false statements in order to protect the value
of corporate investments against ruination from premature
disclosure.5
Much of Professor Ayres's disagreement with us stems from two
sources. First, he appears to believe that we were arguing in favor of
some sort of bizarre "mandatory" rule of corporate law that would
enable managers to make false statements about anything at anytime
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without fear of legal liability.6 Not only is this incorrect, but we can-
not even imagine such a legal regime. In fact, in our view, managers
should engage in misdirection only when doing so is consistent with
their fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to their shareholders.7 Taken
together, these fiduciary duties represent a meta-corporate contract
obligating corporate management to maximize shareholder wealth.
The second area of disagreement between ourselves and Professor
Ayres relates to our conflicting predictions about the corporate disclo-
sure obligation likely to result under the legal regime of free con-
tracting that he endorses, as do we. Here we emphasize that the
important policy question is whether this issue is something about
which firms and shareholders should be permitted to contract. The
particular sort of agreement that will emerge as the dominant form is
an empirical question that is purely academic; nothing turns on it
from a policy perspective.8
As Professor Ayres observes, we predicted in our recent article, for
reasons we presented at some length, that both managers and share-
holders would find it in their interests to reserve the right occasionally
to make false statements in order to preserve the value of corporate
investments.9 We argued that Basic Inc. v. Levinson 10 presented a sit-
uation in which rational, fully informed shareholders likely would
have agreed ex ante to permit their managers to engage in misrepre-
sentations.II In the absence of an express agreement covering the
issue, courts face the question of how to interpret the terms of the
implicit contract between managers and their shareholders. We
argued that any judicial formulation of a corporate disclosure obliga-
tion should conform to the fiduciary duties that form the basic frame-
work of the corporate contract. 2 In particular, fully informed
6 See id. at 14.
7 See Macey & Miller, supra note 2, at 1076.
8 See generally id. at 1068-69 (discussing "hypothetical bargain" approach). Where a
particular corporate contract is silent about whether managers can ever make
misrepresentations, however, courts may look to the actual contractual provisions adopted by
other firms for guidance as to the appropriate default rule.
9 See Ayres, supra note 1, at 959.
10 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
11 See Macey & Miller, supra note 2, at 1069-70, 1072.
12 See id. at 1067-68.
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shareholders negotiating ex ante likely would select a rule of corpo-
rate disclosure that maximized aggregate shareholder wealth.13
Professor Ayres does not address the issue of shareholder wealth-
maximization in his article; therefore, knowing whether he thinks that
firms would adopt the legal regime he advocates because of its wealth-
maximization characteristics or for some other reason, perhaps a
redistributive one, becomes difficult. Moreover, as we discuss below,
the precise contours of his legal regime seem a bit obscure. At times,
he apparently predicts that firms will opt for a rule that would forbid
managerial falsehoods; at other times, he assumes that firms will opt
for a rule that permits managers to engage in misrepresentations, as
long as they inform the market that they may be doing so.
Part I of this Essay elaborates on the areas of disagreement between
Professor Ayres and ourselves on the issue of corporate disclosure. In
Part II, we make some brief observations about his views of market
efficiency. In conclusion, we find his critique unpersuasive and adhere
to our view that corporations should have the option of engaging in
misdirection when necessary to maximize shareholder wealth.
I. THE CORPORATE DISCLOSURE OBLIGATION
A. The Corporate Agency Contract and Shareholder Preferences
Professor Ayres correctly observes our argument that corporate
fraud should be defined by contractually defined fiduciary duties.' 4
After making this observation, however, Professor Ayres accuses us
of overlooking "the implications of being able to contract around any
standard-form fiduciary duty."'" We must confess to a certain confu-
sion on this point. In our understanding, corporate law rules come in
two basic varieties: mandatory legal rules around which parties can-
not contract and contractual rules. By definition, parties may con-
tract around legal rules that are contractual in nature.
Mysteriously, Professor Ayres, having correctly understood our
argument that corporate fraud should be defined in contractual terms,
then accuses us of failing to appreciate the implications of an ability to
contract around unwanted contractual terms. Of course, we think
that the parties should be able to specify by contract the precise
13 See id. at 1072.
14 Ayres, supra note 1, at 948.
15 Id. at 948.
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nature of the corporation's disclosure obligations. To say, as we do,
that a rule is contractual in nature is, at least to us, the same as saying
that one may contract around the rule. Otherwise, our argument
would become that corporate fraud rules should be treated as
mandatory, rather than contractual, in nature. Professor Ayres,
therefore, wrongly accuses us of failing to appreciate the default
nature of the corporate disclosure obligation.
Because we clearly contemplated that corporate disclosure obliga-
tions would represent default rules, the possibility of contracting
around our legal rule does not change our public policy analysis. In a
nutshell, we argue that, from an ex ante perspective, shareholders
will, at times, want their managers to engage in misrepresentations
because doing so will benefit shareholders generally. 16 Thus, our intu-
ition, which appears to us rather uncontroversial, is that shareholders
will opt for the contractual rule that maximizes their wealth.'7
Because of our assumption that shareholders will opt for the disclo-
sure rule that allows them to maximize their wealth ex ante, nowhere
in our analysis does an immutable rule in this regard fit.
Professor Ayres's assertion that "shareholders at a minimum
should have the option of 'warranting' the honesty of their managers'
speech in the articles of incorporation,"18 though true, is not particu-
larly informative. It is uninformative for the same reason that it is
true: shareholders should have the option, within public policy limits,
to do whatever they want ex ante-including altering the basic meta-
rule that puts profit maximization above all else. The interesting
question is not whether shareholders should have the ability to opt
out of a default provision; they have this option in every such context
by definition. The interesting question is: Which rule of corporate
disclosure will rational, profit-maximizing shareholders likely select?
We assume that Professor Ayres would agree that, in the absence of a
specific agreement to the contrary by shareholders, courts should
adopt the legal standard that maximizes shareholder wealth.
Next, Professor Ayres asserts that most shareholders would prefer
a default rule under which managers are assumed to warrant the hon-
esty of corporate speech by impliedly promising to pay damages if
16 Macey & Miller, supra note 2, at 1072.
17 See supra text accompanying note 13.
18 Ayres, supra note 1, at 949-50.
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they engage in misrepresentations. 19 Unfortunately, Professor Ayres
does not substantiate this assertion except by saying that only by mak-
ing such promises "could corporations keep the market from severely
discounting their managers' statements. ' 20 Of course, no evidence
exists that the market does not severely discount the statements of
corporate managers, anyway. Indeed, as Professor Ayres admits,
even before the advent of federal securities laws, firms attempted to
make their statements to the market credible by hiring independent
accountants to verify them.21 And, as he appears to recognize,
"[s]hareholders might prefer, at times, that their managers talk about
the corporation's future prospects without the specter of securities
fraud liability if the prediction does not come to pass. '
Professor Ayres's article thus contains its own refutation. Share-
holders likely will not prefer a default rule that commits managers to
honesty if superior, low-cost substitute mechanisms for managerial
truthfulness, such as independent accountants, lawyers, and invest-
ment bankers, exist. These means of warranting corporate speech
cost less than the managerial warranty of honesty he advocates
because his warranty default would likely have a chilling effect on
managerial speech.
When we add to the above analysis the additional problem, which
Professor Ayres also appears to recognize,2 3 that his warranty policy
carries with it the specter of inefficient or opportunistic lawsuits, his
article appears to endorse, rather than to criticize, our position.
Indeed, Professor Ayres's piece contains some justifications for elimi-
nating managerial liability for false statements that we had not
considered.
In sum, our analysis proceeds along the following lines. First, we
assume the contractual nature of the basic fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty that corporate officers and directors owe to shareholders.
These fiduciary duties represent default rules because they fill certain
"gaps" that inevitably arise in contractual agreements between share-
holders and the firms in which they invest. Second, to fill these gaps,
19 Id. at 952 ("it is difficult to argue that the majority of shareholders would not prefer a
default that warranted honesty.").
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 954.
23 Id. at 955.
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a "meta-rule" must exist to guide the judge who is called upon to
perform such gap-filling in the event of litigation. In the context of
corporate law, the usual meta-rule is one of shareholder wealth-max-
imization. The basis of our analysis is the simple assumption that
shareholders will opt for the (default) legal rule that maximizes their
wealth.
B. The Wealth-Maximizing Misrepresentation
Professor Ayres argues that it is better to say "no comment" in
response to certain questions than to make a false statement. We have
several reactions to this. First, we do not argue, hint, or suggest that
managers should make misrepresentations as a general rule. Indeed,
we emphasized that deception often involves costs and should not be
permitted except in rather unusual circumstances,24 such as those
presented in Basic Inc. v. Levinson. 5 Finally, although generally it
will be best for managers to tell the truth, Professor Ayres's endorse-
ment of the generally accepted "no comment" approach would do
nothing to solve the very real problem that confronted the officers and
directors of Basic as it tried to protect the confidentiality of its merger
negotiations with Consolidated Engineering.
As is common in large, publicly held corporations, stock watchers
and financial analysts often asked the officers and directors of Basic if
it were involved in merger negotiations.2 6 For a long time, the officers
and directors of Basic could truthfully respond in the negative.27 If,
after having denied that they were involved in merger negotiations,
Basic's officers and directors had suddenly changed their response to
"no comment," the "no comment" would have amounted to an
admission that merger discussions were underway. The Supreme
Court virtually acknowledged as much in Basic, but concluded that
"creating an exception to a regulatory scheme founded on a prodis-
closure legislative philosophy, because complying with the regulation
might be 'bad for business,' is a role for Congress, not this Court.
'2 8
24 These circumstances are limited to those "where [strategic misrepresentations are]
necessary to protect existing investments or legitimate corporate opportunities." Macey &
Miller, supra note 2, at 1076.
25 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
26 Id. at 227 n.4.
27 Id. at 226-27.
28 Id. at 240 n.17.
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Thus, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the rule it adopted in
Basic may reduce shareholder welfare in some situations, but con-
cluded that it lacked the authority to modify a validly enacted statute
on the ground that it disagrees with it. Professor Ayres has no such
excuse. He argues that firms should precommit never to respond to
questions such as those regarding mergers.29 This proposed policy
will hardly advance the policy goal of dissemination of information.
Although our endorsement of misrepresentation in limited contexts
may contravene the policy goal of ensuring honesty in the market-
place, one must not overlook, as Professor Ayres does, that corporate
disclosure rules, like all legal rules that attempt to enhance the effi-
ciency of the market, are instrumental rules; they are not ends in
themselves.3 0 In particular, these rules are meant to enhance investor
welfare.31 Whenever a disclosure rule conflicts with the enhancement
of investor wealth-the fundamental goal of the securities laws-the
wealth-maximization rule should predominate, absent an unequivocal
indication to the contrary from shareholders.3 2 Consequently, Profes-
sor Ayres advocates a rule without redeeming virtue, in that it would
not only reduce shareholder welfare in certain circumstances (as in
Basic itself) but would also impair the flow of information to the mar-
ket. In stark contrast, our proposal serves an overriding goal,
grounded in congressional intent-maximizing shareholder value.
We think that the disagreement between Professor Ayres and our-
selves stems from the fact that Ayres fails to appreciate the problem
that rumors present to corporate management. Corporate managers
cannot respond adequately to rumors simply by saying "no com-
ment."3 Protecting a firm's legitimate property rights or expecta-
tions often requires stronger statements, or misrepresentations.34 As
noted above, Basic itself provides an example of such a situation; SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. 35 provides an even more powerful example.
Texas Gulf Sulphur (TGS), after extensive exploration in eastern
Canada, discovered huge deposits of copper, zinc, and silver near
29 See Ayres, supra note 1, at 957-59.
30 Macey & Miller, supra note 2, at 1073-74.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 1074.
33 Id. at 1073.
34 Id. at 1091.
35 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
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Timmins, Ontario.36 Having found that the land they were exploring
contained extensive mineral deposits, TGS faced the problem of not
owning the land.37 Obtaining the mineral rights to the land before the
landowners learned of the mineral deposits became acutely important
to TGS in order to maximize the gains from its search and explora-
tion operations; otherwise, transfer to the landowners, without com-
pensation to TGS, of all of the gains from TGS's search efforts would
result.38 Thus, secrecy acquired paramount importance in this
transaction.
Professor Ayres suggests that TGS should have committed itself ex
ante to a policy of saying "no comment" to all such inquiries where
secrecy is desirable. 39 Barring that, he argues that the firm should
have committed to telling the truth, reserving the option to decline to
warrant the truthfulness of certain statements.40 By contrast, to us it
seems quite clear that TGS's managers should have been able to deny
falsely rumors of its important discovery, until it had succeeded in
securing the mineral rights to the land.
Bluntly stated, we believe the wrongdoers in situations such as
Basic and Texas Gulf Sulphur are the people asking the questions, not
the people telling the falsehoods. The people who asked the questions
about the pendency of merger negotiations in Basic and about the
mineral exploration in Texas Gulf Sulphur tried to expropriate the
value of certain investments made by these companies.4' Allowing
these potential free riders to obtain the valuable information devel-
oped by the corporations at great expense would discourage similar
investment in information. Such discouragement would decrease the
amount of corporate development in areas of mineral discoveries or
synergistic mergers.
Despite the virtues of misrepresentation in these narrow contexts,
we recognized that at least two potential problems exist with any legal
rule that condones false statements by corporate fiduciaries. First, the
36 Id. at 843.
37 Macey & Miller, supra note 2, at 1071.
38 Id.
39 See Ayres, supra note 1, at 957-59.
40 See id. at 953-54.
41 In Basic, the investment came in the form of the time and energy spent by both the bidder
and the target in negotiating a merger, and in Texas Gulf Sulphur, the investment came in the
form of resources devoted to mineral exploration.
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untruthful firm does not internalize all of the costs associated with
such misstatements.42 Second, corporate management may falsely
state its position not to enhance shareholder welfare, but to benefit
itself.4 3 We noted that these problems become less acute when, as in
Basic and Texas Gulf Sulphur, the corporate misrepresentations cause
the price of the firm's shares to trade at artificially low levels, for two
reasons, both of which ensure that managers will make misrepresenta-
tions only for shareholder wealth-maximization purposes.44
False statements that cause a firm's share prices to trade at artifi-
cially low levels make corporate financing more difficult by causing
the market to reduce its estimates of the firm's future income
stream.45 Professor Ayres responds by asserting that misrepresenta-
tions cannot increase a firm's cost of capital if the firm need not bor-
row from the external capital markets.46 On this point, he is almost
correct. He is correct that if a firm obtains no external financing, the
market's assessment of its future income stream will not be relevant to
its cost of capital. He holds an impoverished view of what constitutes
external financing, however. He seems to think that firms resort to
external capital markets only when they engage in investments. This
is incorrect. Virtually all firms are constantly in the market for exter-
nal funds. For example, they finance inventories, they issue commer-
cial paper, they purchase merchandise on credit from suppliers.
When employees receive payment for work they have already done,
they have, in a very real sense, extended credit to their firms. Given
the expansive nature of external financing, we challenge Professor
Ayres to find a firm that does not utilize it.
His observation that sixty to eighty percent of all corporate invest-
ment comes from internally generated cash does not mean that twenty
to forty percent of firms do not attempt to obtain external financing.
First, some of these firms would like to obtain external financing but
cannot. More importantly, almost all of these firms finance them-
selves through a combination of external and internal financing. The
willingness of outsiders-whether they are customers, suppliers,
investors, or banks-to lend to a corporation will depend on the firm's




46 Ayres, supra note 1, at 959-61.
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creditworthiness. The firm's creditworthiness, in turn, will depend on
the market's assessment of the firm's expected future cash flows.
Where corporate misrepresentations cause the market to lower its
expectations concerning the size of future cash flows, that is, to
increase the riskiness of lending to the firm, the firm will be able to
obtain financing only by paying a higher price (rate of interest). Pro-
fessor Ayres mistakenly trivializes the effect of this phenomenon.
In addition, Professor Ayres ignores the agency cost implications of
our arguments. Absent actual insider trading, misrepresentations that
decrease the price of a firm's stock more likely further shareholders'
interests than misrepresentations that increase the price of a firm's
stock. This is true because misrepresentations that decrease the price
of a firm's shares (or prevent it from rising) increase the probability of
an outside bidder making a tender offer for the firm-an event that, if
successful, usually results in target management losing its job. Man-
agers, therefore, have an incentive to engage in misrepresentations to
increase the value of a firm's shares, thereby reducing the probability
of a hostile takeover, in order to entrench themselves in their jobs.47
Consequently, where managerial misrepresentations decrease the
firm's share price, it is unlikely (although not impossible) that the
misrepresentations are made because of agency costs.
C. Ayres's Warranty Default Proposal
Professor Ayres appears to believe that firms can warrant the truth
of their managers' statements only through the device of formal war-
ranty.48 In fact, this is not the case. As noted above, hiring outside
auditors, lawyers, and investment bankers to verify the truth of corpo-
rate statements is a low-cost substitute for formal warranties.4 9 Thus,
little support seems to exist for Professor Ayres's argument that for-
mal warranties are necessary for corporations to be able to speak
credibly to the market.
Curiously, Ayres defends his proposed warranty by claiming that it
would ensure that corporations internalize the costs of their decision
47 Another self-serving reason why managers might falsify statements to inflate stock prices
is to inflate their own salaries, given that the compensation of top corporate managers often is
linked to the share price performance of the firms for which they work.
48 See Ayres, supra note 1, at 952-53.
49 See supra text accompanying notes 21-23.
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to warrant (or not to warrant) their statements.5 0 A scant three pages
earlier, however, he argues that firms may not internalize the cost of
misrepresentations that lower share prices.51 He cannot have it both
ways. Either firms internalize the costs of their misrepresentations, or
they do not.
Even ignoring this inconsistency, Ayres's analysis has two primary
flaws. First, it falsely assumes that firms wanting to signal to the mar-
ket that they are "in play" have no means of doing so besides simply
declaring that they are in play. Not only is this incorrect, but a state-
ment by corporate managers that the firm is in play will likely prove
extremely ineffective. Instead, firms that want market participants to
know they are in play will want to promise credibly that they will
refrain from resisting an outside bid. This might be done by inserting
provisions in the articles of incorporation that prevent the firm from
resisting takeover bids 2.5 These sorts of provisions will prove far more
effective than simply issuing statements of the kind Professor Ayres
describes. Thus, more ways of precommitting to passivity exist than
Professor Ayres appears to recognize.
The failure of Ayres's argument to appreciate the market's likely
response to his warranty system presents a second and more funda-
mental flaw. He argues for a default warranty of honesty that would
make managers' statements credible by holding managers personally
liable for misrepresentations. In this respect, Ayres's scheme is iden-
tical to the current treatment of corporate misstatements under the
antifraud rules. But Professor Ayres further argues that managers
also should have the ability to give the market notice that a particular
corporate statement "must be taken 'as is,' with no warrant of verac-
ity."53 Avoiding the conclusion that managers would accomplish
nothing by making a false statement, and then declaring that the
statement must be taken "as is," seems impossible. Unless the listen-
ers suffered from collective brain damage, they inevitably would con-
clude that the statement was false if the corporation routinely
warranted its other statements. Thus, Professor Ayres's warranty
approach to corporate speech suffers from the same problems as the
50 See Ayres, supra note 1, at 962.
51 See id. at 959-61.
52 See Haddock, Macey & McChesney, Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender
Offers, 73 Va. L. Rev. 701, 726-33 (1987).
53 See Ayres, supra note 1, at 962.
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"no comment" approach: a corporation that switched from making
statements under warranty to making a particular statement "as is,"
like a corporation that switched its response to certain questions from
"no"l or "yes" to "no comment," would fool no one. 4
II. MARKET EFFICIENCY AND FIDUCIARY DuTiES
Professor Ayres also argues that beliefs about whether the stock
market is informationally or fundamentally efficient will determine
shareholder preferences concerning corporate speech. Professor
Ayres defines informational efficiency to be the state of affairs that
exists when "certain classes of information are immediately incorpo-
rated into a stock's price." 5 Fundamental efficiency, according to
him, exists if a stock price reflects only information relating to the
"net present value of the corporation's future profits."56 Professor
Ayres claims his distinction between fundamental and informational
efficiency is consistent with the famous analogy John Maynard
Keynes drew between the stock market and the newspaper beauty
contests of the 1930s.'7 Professor Ayres's distinction differs funda-
mentally from Keynes's analogy. It is also fundamentally incoherent.
Professor Ayres leaves us to wonder what, if anything, Keynes's
analogy has to do with his distinction between informational effi-
ciency and fundamental efficiency. In a fundamentally efficient mar-
ket, share prices for a stock will reflect the present value of future
flows to shareholders."8 Share prices in a fundamentally efficient mar-
54 It may be that this is precisely the result Ayres seeks-a de facto prohibition on
misrepresentation. If this is the case, then we fail to see any meaningful difference between his
warranty default and a mandatory warranty rule.
55 See Ayres, supra note 1, at 946.
56 Id.
57 Keynes likened investing in the stock market to competitions in which readers were asked
to look at photographs of women's faces in order to determine which contestants the readers as
a group would find the prettiest. Thus readers were not asked who they thought was prettiest.
Rather, they were asked who they thought other readers would think were prettiest. Of
course, the winner of the contest would be the reader best able to predict what most of the
other readers thought the average opinion to be. See id. at 968.
58 Contrary to Professor Ayres's assertion, see Ayres, supra note 1, at 969 n.97,
fundamental efficiency does not require that stock prices equal the present discounted value of
a corporation's expected earnings. Earnings will only be reflected in a firm's share prices to the
extent that such earnings ultimately are paid out to shareholders. For example, if a firm has a
new management team that is expected to double the firm's earnings, the firm's share prices
still will not change if the new management pays all of those earnings out to itself in the form
of salaries and bonuses.
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ket will not change unless the market receives new information of an
occurrence that reflects poorly on the firm's future cash flows. As a
result, a market has fundamental efficiency if and only if it has the
ability to "process" quickly new information about the firm's future
cash flows.
5 9
If, in fact, fundamental efficiency implies informational efficiency,
what then is the distinction Professor Ayres draws between funda-
mentally efficient stock markets and informationally efficient stock
markets? The difference appears to be that informationally efficient
markets may respond to certain information that has no bearing on
corporate cash flows. For example, to use his own illustrations, if
information about sunspots or the price of tea in China affects the
price of IBM's shares, then, according to Professor Ayres, the market
for IBM stock is informationally efficient, but not fundamentally
efficient.
Professor Ayres's unproven, unelaborated assertion that stock mar-
kets simultaneously can be informationally efficient and fundamen-
tally inefficient presents staggering implications. If true, then rational
shareholders would want their managers "to trade-off underlying eco-
nomic profits to increase the current stock price. ' 6° Followed to its
logical conclusion, this argument at the very least suggests that much
of corporate law simply is irrelevant to shareholder welfare. And, to
the extent that Ayres asserts that a trade-off between fundamental and
informational efficiency exists, his thesis militates in favor of overrul-
ing virtually all of the basic doctrines of corporate law, which obligate
corporate management to maximize firm value. These include the
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty, the corporate opportunity doc-
trine, and the director conflict of interest statutes, not to mention the
many other doctrines grounded in the notion that corporate officers
and directors have a residual obligation to maximize firm value for
shareholders.
But with what are we to replace these rules? Professor Ayres
agrees that shareholders will want managers to increase current share
prices. But how will this be done? If the stock market lacks funda-
59 "Processing" new information includes distinguishing among various forms of
information, disregarding information that has no bearing on a firm's future cash flows, and
assessing accurately the extent to which other information will in fact affect future corporate
cash flows.
60 Ayres, supra note 1, at 987.
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mental efficiency, then no reason exists to believe that management
has any control over share value-after all, management has no con-
trol over sunspots and the price of tea in China. If Professor Ayres is
correct, then, not only does no reason exist to enforce positive disclo-
sure obligations, but no coherent rationale exists for imposing fiduci-
ary duties on officers and directors because such duties, to the extent
they are effective, require management to maximize firm value.61 If
maximizing firm value will not benefit shareholders because stock
markets lack fundamental efficiency, then no reason exists to impose
these rules on officers and directors.
Rather than adopt Professor Ayres's extreme position, we would
say that, if information about sunspots or the price of tea in China
affects the price of IBM's shares, the market for IBM's shares is
behaving irrationally. If sunspots cause IBM's share prices to fluctu-
ate, then we really do not have a theory that explains why share prices
move. If share prices fluctuate because of sunspots, then no assurance
exists that a merger announcement at a fifty percent premium over
the current market price will cause that firm's stock to increase pro-
portionally in value, or at all. After all, sunspots on the date of the
merger announcement might counteract any upward pressure exerted
by the merger announcement. Thus, Professor Ayres wrongly asserts
that, regardless of fundamental efficiency, informationally efficient
markets will generate detrimental price effects when corporations mis-
represent themselves,62 because if markets are not fundamentally effi-
cient, no basis exists for determining what effect, if any, new
information will have on a firm's share price.63
If courts cannot assess price changes in the absence of fundamental
efficiency, how can they assess the effects of corporate disclosure at
all? Indeed, in irrational markets, disclosure is wholly irrelevant,
61 If stock markets are informationally efficient but fundamentally inefficient, policymakers
are in desperate need of some theory to explain what sorts of information affect share prices.
As Professor Ayres's examples of sunspots and the price of tea in China suggest, we lack even
the beginnings of a model of nonfundamental efficiency. As such, it is not surprising that the
policy analysis in the second half of Professor Ayres's article is unsatisfying. We need some
theory about the processes by which markets become efficient before we can discuss how the
legal system should deal with the issue of corporate disclosure.
62 Ayres, supra note 1, at 984.
63 Professor Ayres himself appears to acknowledge this point when he observes that "if the
market is not fundamentally efficient... courts lose their ability to assess how much the price
would have been but for the corporate misrepresentation." Id. at 984.
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because disclosure will not have predictable effects on share prices.
Evidently, a market cannot have fundamental efficiency unless it also
has informational efficiency, because a market cannot achieve funda-
mental efficiency unless it can process information relating to corpo-
rate cash flows. 64 Equally clearly, a market cannot be fundamentally
inefficient yet informationally efficient unless share prices move ran-
domly and incoherently. If share prices move randomly and incoher-
ently, then it seems inappropriate to hold corporate officers and
directors responsible for misrepresentations as there is no way to
know whether such misrepresentations in fact had any effect on share
prices.
CONCLUSION
The first half of Professor Ayres's article examines the question of
whether corporate misrepresentations should be actionable by share-
holders. Professor Ayres correctly argues that the actionability of
misrepresentations should be determined with reference to the fiduci-
ary duties that corporate officers and directors owe to their sharehold-
ers. Professor Ayres also correctly says that corporations should be
allowed to contract around their obligation to disclose truthful infor-
mation, where nondisclosure or misrepresentation would maximize
shareholder wealth. But, in our view, Professor Ayres fails to argue
convincingly against our position that if firms were allowed to con-
tract freely with their shareholders, the shareholders would, at times,
find it in their interests to allow their officers and directors to make
misrepresentations in order to protect corporate investments from the
opportunism of outside parties.
In the second part of his article, Professor Ayres argues that securi-
ties markets can have informational efficiency without fundamental
efficiency. Incoherent price movements would characterize markets
that are informationally efficient but not fundamentally efficient.
Lacking a theory about the effect of types of information on share
prices, one simply cannot predict the effects of corporate misrepresen-
tations on share prices. Similarly, the standard rationale for fashion-
ing rules of corporate governance-to protect shareholders from
managerial activities that transfer wealth from the shareholders to the
managers-loses force because, unless we embrace the idea of funda-
64 See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
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mental efficiency, we have no reason to assert that management activi-
ties-even misrepresentations-can harm shareholders.
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